Hoor Asrar describes a contentious situation and patriotism in Pakistan
Pakistani society has been raised in a state of war frenzy and bellicosity has remained the cornerstone of the Pakistani national narrative. The militaristic terms were integrated with the political culture of patriotism in Pakistan after the rise of the military in the country and they were popularised with the triumphal use of force that conferred greater acceptability and brought political success enabling the policymakers to create a situation in which war always remains a possibility.
The policymakers and final decision-makers took care to encompass both endogamous and exogamous features, to explain both pressures and desires within states and aspects of their interaction. In this scenario, it became more than clear that conflict may also serve government interests on both sides of the established divide. It could serve to justify the monopolization of power, policy shifts, and the mobilization of resources.
The clear result is that the political climate of patriotism in Pakistan is always kept on the boil and it is misleading to treat jingoism and the response to foreign powers as separate. It is also taken care of that the very bellicosity of a government or society is used to encourage the polity to scapegoat foreign powers and peoples, and to emphasize reports of the international situation that favor a resort to force.
This psychological preparedness is a major cause of conflicts and aggression. In this context, the policymakers ensure that bellicosity remains a constant, at governmental, societal, and systemic levels and this is one of the cardinal principles followed in Pakistan. The problem in this connection is that there is no easy measure of jingoism.
Patriotism In Pakistan
To assess it by counting the frequency and, in some way, measuring the intensity of conflict is only of limited value, most clearly because it does not consider bellicosity that does not lead to it. It is difficult to assess, certainly in any readily measurable fashion, the degree to which jingoism and conflict are crucial, indeed integral, to particular governments, societies, and states.
And in addition, to work out relationships between these particular categories. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze both the composition and the culture of governing groups in order to ascertain their military interests and militaristic ethos.
The wider social implications of this approach can be extended to include political groups not otherwise integrated into the mainstream of social patterns and practices. It has become more than clear patriotism in Pakistan context that there is a relationship between the social system and jingoism, a sociology of violence that was linked to economics and environment and a trajectory that was associated with social change.
Such an interpretation places a premium on internal rather than external causes of war, on war as a product of domestic forces rather than the international system. It should be borne in mind that large-scale group fighting, a crucial feature of jingoistic practices, is the definition of war and more specifically, that a dichotomy of hostility and war is not a helpful way of viewing relations between and within many states.
To refer to jingoistic as a necessary condition for war is not, therefore, to confuse cause and effect but to assert that in many circumstances the two are coterminous and that both are descriptive concepts. The jingoistic elements help explain why some disputes lead to war and others do not, and why, in particular, some governing elites accept, and even welcome, risk.
Rational And Irrational Motivation
Similarly, the willingness to accept ambiguity and compromise varies greatly and this willingness is of growing importance in disputes as the action-reaction process reveals incompatible goals. The transformation of disputes into crises and of crises into war – indeed the very definition of crises as wars – depends not so much on the dispute in question as on how it is perceived. In short, jingoism creates the severity of a crisis and then often ensures how it is handled.
In this connotation, bellicosity is crucial to the point that having a reason to fight does not necessarily entail action and it is necessary to explain the latter as much as the former. Furthermore, the use of the concept of jingoism, in part, overcomes the unhelpful distinction between rationality and irrationality in the motivation and conduct of patriotism in Pakistan.
Jingoism can be regarded as both, or either, a rational and irrational response to circumstances. Such an argument, also, helps address the suggestion that while cultural factors act as an enabling force in allowing wars to happen, they do not cause them and that, instead, politicians have to want to go to war for some perceived benefit to the state.
It is more than obvious here that any explanation of the war in a non-deterministic causal fashion depends on the reasoning of the participants. Such reasoning may well be deemed irrational by another view of rationality. However, the adequacy of explanation based on reasoning depends on the character of the evidence. The Weekender
Jingoism in Pakistani society
ByHoor Asrar Rauf
A national swimming champion and recently Graduated from UCF-USA in Hospitality and Event Management
Dated
October 29, 2022
Hoor Asrar describes a contentious situation and patriotism in Pakistan
Pakistani society has been raised in a state of war frenzy and bellicosity has remained the cornerstone of the Pakistani national narrative. The militaristic terms were integrated with the political culture of patriotism in Pakistan after the rise of the military in the country and they were popularised with the triumphal use of force that conferred greater acceptability and brought political success enabling the policymakers to create a situation in which war always remains a possibility.
The policymakers and final decision-makers took care to encompass both endogamous and exogamous features, to explain both pressures and desires within states and aspects of their interaction. In this scenario, it became more than clear that conflict may also serve government interests on both sides of the established divide. It could serve to justify the monopolization of power, policy shifts, and the mobilization of resources.
The clear result is that the political climate of patriotism in Pakistan is always kept on the boil and it is misleading to treat jingoism and the response to foreign powers as separate. It is also taken care of that the very bellicosity of a government or society is used to encourage the polity to scapegoat foreign powers and peoples, and to emphasize reports of the international situation that favor a resort to force.
This psychological preparedness is a major cause of conflicts and aggression. In this context, the policymakers ensure that bellicosity remains a constant, at governmental, societal, and systemic levels and this is one of the cardinal principles followed in Pakistan. The problem in this connection is that there is no easy measure of jingoism.
Patriotism In Pakistan
To assess it by counting the frequency and, in some way, measuring the intensity of conflict is only of limited value, most clearly because it does not consider bellicosity that does not lead to it. It is difficult to assess, certainly in any readily measurable fashion, the degree to which jingoism and conflict are crucial, indeed integral, to particular governments, societies, and states.
And in addition, to work out relationships between these particular categories. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze both the composition and the culture of governing groups in order to ascertain their military interests and militaristic ethos.
The wider social implications of this approach can be extended to include political groups not otherwise integrated into the mainstream of social patterns and practices. It has become more than clear patriotism in Pakistan context that there is a relationship between the social system and jingoism, a sociology of violence that was linked to economics and environment and a trajectory that was associated with social change.
Such an interpretation places a premium on internal rather than external causes of war, on war as a product of domestic forces rather than the international system. It should be borne in mind that large-scale group fighting, a crucial feature of jingoistic practices, is the definition of war and more specifically, that a dichotomy of hostility and war is not a helpful way of viewing relations between and within many states.
To refer to jingoistic as a necessary condition for war is not, therefore, to confuse cause and effect but to assert that in many circumstances the two are coterminous and that both are descriptive concepts. The jingoistic elements help explain why some disputes lead to war and others do not, and why, in particular, some governing elites accept, and even welcome, risk.
Rational And Irrational Motivation
Similarly, the willingness to accept ambiguity and compromise varies greatly and this willingness is of growing importance in disputes as the action-reaction process reveals incompatible goals. The transformation of disputes into crises and of crises into war – indeed the very definition of crises as wars – depends not so much on the dispute in question as on how it is perceived. In short, jingoism creates the severity of a crisis and then often ensures how it is handled.
In this connotation, bellicosity is crucial to the point that having a reason to fight does not necessarily entail action and it is necessary to explain the latter as much as the former. Furthermore, the use of the concept of jingoism, in part, overcomes the unhelpful distinction between rationality and irrationality in the motivation and conduct of patriotism in Pakistan.
Jingoism can be regarded as both, or either, a rational and irrational response to circumstances. Such an argument, also, helps address the suggestion that while cultural factors act as an enabling force in allowing wars to happen, they do not cause them and that, instead, politicians have to want to go to war for some perceived benefit to the state.
It is more than obvious here that any explanation of the war in a non-deterministic causal fashion depends on the reasoning of the participants. Such reasoning may well be deemed irrational by another view of rationality. However, the adequacy of explanation based on reasoning depends on the character of the evidence. The Weekender
Share
Get Newsletters