M Ali Siddiqi talks about a Conflict prone global arena
Conflict prone global arena owing to its very nature the international arena is chaotic as it comprises elements that are mostly diametrically opposite to each other in nature and context. The result is that the movement of international affairs is highly uneven and it is extremely difficult to predict their future movements. The multiplicity of angles associated with international affairs keeps their practitioners deeply engaged and mostly in a state of frenzy. International system is therefore inherently fractious and the differences between countries are considered an integral part of the international system. These differences are very natural and one cannot deny them. Sensitivity to multiple perspectives also allows the observers to recognise that there are always key divisions, or cleavages, within any international system.
In this context one can cite the example of a division between rich and poor or developed and developing countries. Since developed countries tend to inhabit the northern hemisphere and less developed ones are generally found in the southern hemisphere, the parlance to describe them is the North–South divide in world politics that is very prominent and is also the cause of most of the problems confronting the world. It may be interjected here that there is a general difference in perspective between developed and developing countries on international economic issues. In developed states, where standards of living are higher, people worry that jobs are subjected to and will continue to be lost in international trade to developing states, where labour is much cheaper. American workers worry about competition from China, while German and French workers worry about competition from labour in Greece or Turkey. Northern countries also feel that southern countries, as they develop, should play their part to advance international economic cooperation by opening their markets to the products prepared in the North.
On the other hand, and quite obviously, the view from the South is different. Southern countries point out that it is difficult to develop in a world economy dominated by established, rich states. Developing economies want special exceptions in international trade and they want access to Northern markets, like agriculture, even if the Northern countries do not have symmetrical access to their markets. These debates are played out in various international forums, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. There are, of course, different perspectives within developed and developing countries as well. In the United States, people tend to believe the government should play a more modest role in influencing the international or domestic economy than is typically expected in European countries and Japan. In the less developed world, countries that are primarily agriculture exporters view the world economy differently than oil producers and exporters. Exporters of manufactured goods, like South Korea or Taiwan, will have a different perspective on trade negotiations as well.
There are also North–South divisions on environmental issues. The United States refused to ratify a global agreement on carbon emissions, the Kyoto Protocol, because it felt the burden of reducing emissions was not shared equally among all countries, including big developing countries like China. Developing countries argue that the existing rich countries developed without worrying about the natural environment, and now expect today’s poorer countries to inhibit their own development due to environmental problems, which poorer countries see as caused by the more industrial North. Developing countries like India and China also demand aid and technology from the North to assist them in limiting emissions and adapting to the impact of climate change.
There used to be an important cleavage in international relations between East and West. During the Cold War the world was divided between communist and non-communist countries. The Western countries viewed themselves as defending the rights of the individual and political and economic freedoms. The communist countries generally located in the eastern part of Europe but also in Asia and Central America, viewed capitalism as exploitative and saw themselves defending social values, such as full employment and a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. Each side in this conflict viewed the other as a threat and tried to enlist the support of neutral countries to its cause. The East–West division in world politics ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Eastern side.
The existence of cleavages or divisions among states within any international system leads us to what historically has been a vexing problem in international politics, that of dissatisfied states. These states may remain frustrated, patiently build their power, or become aggressive in an effort to advance their relative positions. Germany, Japan, and Italy after World War I are classic cases of dissatisfied states. Italy desired colonial possessions befitting its self-image as a great power. Germany sought respect and influence after what it considered the humiliation of the settlement that ended World War I. Japan, a vulnerable island economy, desired economic security, which its leaders believed could be best achieved by occupying its resource-rich neighbours. The dissatisfaction of these states and their determination to rectify it was an important cause of World War II.
A dissatisfied state is potentially dangerous but it is not always easy to recognise. States may act aggressively because they are dissatisfied and intent on transforming the international system, or because they feel threatened and insecure. During the Cold War, policy makers and analysts in the Western countries continually debated whether the Soviet Union was a dissatisfied state intent on world domination, or a troubled and insecure great power that needed to control its immediate neighborhood because it felt threatened by a more technologically advanced set of Western countries. If the Soviet Union was primarily aggressive, it needed to be contained; if it was primarily insecure, then reassurance and cooperation might be the more appropriate foreign policy. The failure to contain an aggressive country could lead to trouble if that country believed itself free to dominate others. But an aggressive response to an insecure country could be provocative, reinforcing fear and insecurity and leading to a conflict that perhaps neither side wanted.
International relations refer to this general problem as the security dilemma. Although it is not always easy to distinguish dissatisfied states from defensive states, it is important to do so because the stakes are very high. In today’s international system, many analysts are debating the extent to which China is a dissatisfied state that will eventually disrupt world order, a defensive state mainly seeking to resolve its internal problems and command a degree of international respect, or a satisfied state content to accept the current rules of the international order. A similar debate is taking place at a regional level, concerning the intentions and aspirations of Iran. To some, Iran is a disruptive force seeking weapons of mass destruction to threaten Israel and Sunni-controlled regimes in the Gulf region. To others, Iran is an insecure middle power that feels threatened by the world’s dominant power, the United States. The appropriate foreign policy depends on whether one has a clear understanding of the perspective of the country in question and developing such perspective is easier said than done and may require radical alteration in the way international affairs are conducted. This fact is always to be kept in view while developing a deeper understanding of global affairs. TW
M Ali Siddiqi is a writer who contributes to leading
periodicals
Conflict prone global arena
Bytheweekendr
Dated
April 17, 2023
M Ali Siddiqi talks about a Conflict prone global arena
Conflict prone global arena owing to its very nature the international arena is chaotic as it comprises elements that are mostly diametrically opposite to each other in nature and context. The result is that the movement of international affairs is highly uneven and it is extremely difficult to predict their future movements. The multiplicity of angles associated with international affairs keeps their practitioners deeply engaged and mostly in a state of frenzy. International system is therefore inherently fractious and the differences between countries are considered an integral part of the international system. These differences are very natural and one cannot deny them. Sensitivity to multiple perspectives also allows the observers to recognise that there are always key divisions, or cleavages, within any international system.
In this context one can cite the example of a division between rich and poor or developed and developing countries. Since developed countries tend to inhabit the northern hemisphere and less developed ones are generally found in the southern hemisphere, the parlance to describe them is the North–South divide in world politics that is very prominent and is also the cause of most of the problems confronting the world. It may be interjected here that there is a general difference in perspective between developed and developing countries on international economic issues. In developed states, where standards of living are higher, people worry that jobs are subjected to and will continue to be lost in international trade to developing states, where labour is much cheaper. American workers worry about competition from China, while German and French workers worry about competition from labour in Greece or Turkey. Northern countries also feel that southern countries, as they develop, should play their part to advance international economic cooperation by opening their markets to the products prepared in the North.
On the other hand, and quite obviously, the view from the South is different. Southern countries point out that it is difficult to develop in a world economy dominated by established, rich states. Developing economies want special exceptions in international trade and they want access to Northern markets, like agriculture, even if the Northern countries do not have symmetrical access to their markets. These debates are played out in various international forums, such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation. There are, of course, different perspectives within developed and developing countries as well. In the United States, people tend to believe the government should play a more modest role in influencing the international or domestic economy than is typically expected in European countries and Japan. In the less developed world, countries that are primarily agriculture exporters view the world economy differently than oil producers and exporters. Exporters of manufactured goods, like South Korea or Taiwan, will have a different perspective on trade negotiations as well.
There are also North–South divisions on environmental issues. The United States refused to ratify a global agreement on carbon emissions, the Kyoto Protocol, because it felt the burden of reducing emissions was not shared equally among all countries, including big developing countries like China. Developing countries argue that the existing rich countries developed without worrying about the natural environment, and now expect today’s poorer countries to inhibit their own development due to environmental problems, which poorer countries see as caused by the more industrial North. Developing countries like India and China also demand aid and technology from the North to assist them in limiting emissions and adapting to the impact of climate change.
There used to be an important cleavage in international relations between East and West. During the Cold War the world was divided between communist and non-communist countries. The Western countries viewed themselves as defending the rights of the individual and political and economic freedoms. The communist countries generally located in the eastern part of Europe but also in Asia and Central America, viewed capitalism as exploitative and saw themselves defending social values, such as full employment and a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. Each side in this conflict viewed the other as a threat and tried to enlist the support of neutral countries to its cause. The East–West division in world politics ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Eastern side.
The existence of cleavages or divisions among states within any international system leads us to what historically has been a vexing problem in international politics, that of dissatisfied states. These states may remain frustrated, patiently build their power, or become aggressive in an effort to advance their relative positions. Germany, Japan, and Italy after World War I are classic cases of dissatisfied states. Italy desired colonial possessions befitting its self-image as a great power. Germany sought respect and influence after what it considered the humiliation of the settlement that ended World War I. Japan, a vulnerable island economy, desired economic security, which its leaders believed could be best achieved by occupying its resource-rich neighbours. The dissatisfaction of these states and their determination to rectify it was an important cause of World War II.
A dissatisfied state is potentially dangerous but it is not always easy to recognise. States may act aggressively because they are dissatisfied and intent on transforming the international system, or because they feel threatened and insecure. During the Cold War, policy makers and analysts in the Western countries continually debated whether the Soviet Union was a dissatisfied state intent on world domination, or a troubled and insecure great power that needed to control its immediate neighborhood because it felt threatened by a more technologically advanced set of Western countries. If the Soviet Union was primarily aggressive, it needed to be contained; if it was primarily insecure, then reassurance and cooperation might be the more appropriate foreign policy. The failure to contain an aggressive country could lead to trouble if that country believed itself free to dominate others. But an aggressive response to an insecure country could be provocative, reinforcing fear and insecurity and leading to a conflict that perhaps neither side wanted.
International relations refer to this general problem as the security dilemma. Although it is not always easy to distinguish dissatisfied states from defensive states, it is important to do so because the stakes are very high. In today’s international system, many analysts are debating the extent to which China is a dissatisfied state that will eventually disrupt world order, a defensive state mainly seeking to resolve its internal problems and command a degree of international respect, or a satisfied state content to accept the current rules of the international order. A similar debate is taking place at a regional level, concerning the intentions and aspirations of Iran. To some, Iran is a disruptive force seeking weapons of mass destruction to threaten Israel and Sunni-controlled regimes in the Gulf region. To others, Iran is an insecure middle power that feels threatened by the world’s dominant power, the United States. The appropriate foreign policy depends on whether one has a clear understanding of the perspective of the country in question and developing such perspective is easier said than done and may require radical alteration in the way international affairs are conducted. This fact is always to be kept in view while developing a deeper understanding of global affairs. TW
M Ali Siddiqi is a writer who contributes to leading
periodicals
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